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To understand what this volume is, we must begin with what it isn’t. That story starts a century 
ago when physics was king. Philosophers, economists, and sociologists appropriated tools forged 
for classical mechanics and thermodynamics as they tried to develop rigorous scientific 
explanations for human social phenomena (see Porter 1995). Through the century after the heyday 
of the Vienna Circle, the life sciences began to command the greatest share of scientific funding, 
prestige, and influence and we began asking whether evolutionary biology might offer a more apt 
basis for sound scientific insight into human culture and cognition. As important a transition as 
this was, it preserved many methodological assumptions that originated in the physical sciences 
and so early attempts to explain cognition and culture in biological terms proceeded from the 
same type of reductionist thinking that logical positivism epitomized. These are the foil for this 
collection, which considers evolution, culture, and cognition as mutually supporting processes 
rather than trying to understand the second two as straightforward consequences of the first. 
 
The common theme among the approaches against which this volume reacts is a tendency to cast 
cultural or cognitive phenomena as extensions of more basic biological processes. Memetics 
defines an individuated unit, the meme, to act as a selfish self-replicator that can be modeled like 
gene selection (Dawkins 1976). Evolutionary Psychology postulates that conditions in early human 
history offer selective explanations today’s psychological and cultural landscape (Barkow et al. 
1992). These approaches reflect a longstanding and widely adopted presumption that culture is 
explicable in terms of basic biological laws. Caporael, Griesemer, and Wimsatt set this volume in 
direct opposition to what they call “the gene’s eye view” of biology and human societies, eschewing 
the reductive assumptions that often accompany gene selectionism and population genetics. 
Instead, their positive program asks us to consider “scaffolding” as an overarching framework that 
can be adapted to evolutionary, developmental, cognitive, social, and cultural change at all scales. 
 
What is scaffolding in this context? When understood as identifying something in the world, 
scaffolds are the supporting structures and processes that help individuals or systems acquire new 
capacities. Examples might include a cell’s role in supporting virus production, the caregiver 
interactions that help children develop language proficiency, and the training regimes and 
socialization processes that allow sports teams to function as a cooperative unit. Speaking more 
broadly, scaffolding is a theoretical tool that complements neo-Darwinism by giving a larger role to 
development while identifying and filling in the gaps where population genetics has little to say. 
Scaffolding structures and scaffolding processes—the concept’s entity/process duality is critical—
support the developmental trajectories experienced by adaptive systems at all scales. Scaffolds are 
often rendered obscure once they complete their supporting roles and fall away. Like the wooden 
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scaffolds that support an arch while it is being assembled or allow a worker to repair the stonework 
on a crumbling cathedral, biological, cognitive, and cultural scaffolds are critical to the acquisition, 
transmission, and maintenance of developmental capacities and yet the details of their operation 
are difficult to infer from the finished product. Whether scaffolding is a metaphor, a heuristic, or a 
full-fledged theoretical program bears further discussion, but it will be useful first to consider the 
vocabulary through which the editors evolve it and how the contributors to this volume deploy it. 
 
Each editor contributes a piece to the book’s first section. These three essays develop the suite of 
conceptual tools that the editors aim to unite within the scaffolding approach. Griesemer begins 
by describing the reproduce perspective, defining reproduction as a process in which material 
overlap between an entity and its offspring confers developmental capacities to the offspring. This 
definition encompasses obvious examples like the transfer of genetic material during gamete fusion, 
but it is also interesting for highlighting the differences between biological reproduction, for which 
material overlap is central, and cultural transmission, for which it is not. Caporael introduces the 
concepts of repeated assembly and core configurations. At the most general level, repeated 
assemblies are recurrent interactions between entities and their environments that play some role 
themselves in their own recurrence. Examples could include everything from protein folding to the 
annual meeting of a professional society. The particular examples Caporael highlights are core 
configurations, human groups of roughly similar size that have been associated with particular 
types of tasks across cultures in human history. Finally, W. Wimsatt introduces entrenchment: the 
notion that the more richly connected a feature of a dynamic system is to downstream 
consequences for the system, the more that feature will resist perturbation. A gene with a great 
many developmental consequences will be less prone to change through selective processes, just as 
deeply rooted cultural practices that shape the ordering and function of an institution often prove 
difficult to dislodge. 
 
Two similarities among this suite of concepts make up the conceptual core of the approach this 
volume describes and illustrates. First, these concepts are scale insensitive. They can be applied 
equally well at many levels of organization and so avoid privileging a particular scale of analysis. 
The reproducer perspective can capture DNA-based genetic transfer, but it also describes the 
process by which a new company forms when a subset of employees breaks away from and old one, 
as happened in the late 1950s when technical staff began an exodus from Shockley Semiconductor 
Laboratory, precipitating the growth of Silicon Valley (Riordan and Hoddeson 1997). In the same 
manner, repeated assemblies and entrenchment, as seen in the examples offered above, can be 
found with equal ease on the molecular scale and the institutional scale. 
 
Second, these concepts treat boundaries of all kinds as conventional. They are not committed to 
hard and fast distinctions among entities, between entities and their environments, or between 
entities and processes. Much to the contrary, the framework that emerges here insists that the 
precise location of these boundaries depends upon an interpretive frame of reference. From the 
reproducer perspective, for instance, we see material overlap from individual to gamete and gamete 
to zygote, but it does not imbue any one of these stages with special ontological status. Rather, 
Griesemer suggests that how biologists choose to trace particular features of this process is critical 
for developing an entity’s provisional definitional boundaries. Likewise, repeated assembly and 
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entrenchment focus our attention on processes, in which the exact parameters for individuating 
the entities participating in those processes are secondary to how one constructs them. 
 
Scale insensitivity and the conventionality of boundaries are the leitmotifs for the remainder of the 
volume, which consists of articles that either apply one or more of the editors’ concepts directly or 
use an approach that is consonant with them. Flexibility across scope and scale is highlighted in 
Section II, which examines how constraints provided by the physical properties of critical 
molecules scaffolds the development of embryonic body plans (Newman), how the form and 
structure of communication media scaffold human cognition (Evans), and how model building 
can be construed as scaffolding for scientific understanding (Schank et al.). Although they consider 
scales from molecules to human communities and temporal spans from deep evolutionary time to 
the timeline of an experiment, these three studies use scaffolding in the same substantive way, 
highlighting developmentally crucial features of ostensibly radically different processes that would 
otherwise get short shrift. By grouping these pieces, the editors illustrate how scale-invariant 
concepts help hedge against charges of pernicious oversimplification that bedevil gene-level 
approaches to culture and cognition. 
 
Section III brings the question of boundaries to the fore. Lyon shows how the evolution of human 
cognition is intimately intertwined with external stressors; Theiner argues that the group should be 
considered the relevant cognitive agent in certain contexts; Heintz describes a rich process of 
codetermination between cognition and culture that calls into question any strict boundary 
between the two. Read against the theoretical background provided in Section I, these essays 
crystalize the point that drawing boundaries or defining relationships, such as scaffolding 
relationships, is a theory-laden act and should therefore be explicitly articulated with reference to a 
set of interpretive goals. Having units of analysis is important, but defining them is in itself an act 
of interpretation, especially when dealing with the complexities of culture. 
 
As should be evident by now, the editors consciously avoided grouping the contributions into 
traditional subject or disciplinary categories such as evolution, cognition, and culture, or biology, 
philosophy, and social science, instead hoping to highlight common themes across papers written 
with different topics and methodological aims. This strategy, which exposed novel consonances 
between the papers in Sections II and III, begins to strain in Sections IV and V, which do not 
exhibit the same thematic consistency. In Section IV, Allen discusses how symbols, entrenched as 
parts of various communication systems, scaffold cognitive development. Martínez brings a similar 
approach to artifacts and diagrams. Gerson, in a piece that might have been more effective earlier 
in the volume, takes a more abstract stance by adopting an institution-level perspective on the 
question of how we should define culture and cultural change and summarizing the difficulties 
that arise from straightforward analogies between evolutionary and cultural change. The goal of 
this section is to show reciprocal relationships between processes at different scales, but few such 
connections are drawn explicitly in the papers themselves leaving it to the reader to make that leap. 
 
Section V is entitled “Reproduction and Development,” a category general enough that almost any 
of the volume’s contributions might have fit within it. The four papers here, each interesting and 
insightful in its own right, fit together less by being applications of the concepts articulated earlier 
in the volume than they do by being independent expressions of similar ideas. Murman argues that 
 
 
 
 4 
evolutionary approaches to economic development can benefit from considering how institutional 
scaffolding helps individual firms acquire the capacities they need to survive. Contributions from 
Tavory et al. and Li make no mention of scaffolding, but nonetheless resonate with the volume’s 
objectives. The former develops a developmental system theory approach to cultural evolution, 
arguing that to understand how cultural phenomena perpetuate themselves we need to take the 
systems in which they are expressed as our unit of analysis, rather than looking for a potent causal 
agent at some lower level of complexity. The latter’s discussion of brain plasticity provides a basis 
for discussing how large-scale cultural processes exert influence on human development, and so 
should be taken seriously, as biological processes. Finally, B. Wimsatt provides the most direct and 
reflexive application of the volume’s core concepts by considering how different varieties of 
scaffolding shape scientific career trajectories at different stages. 
 
In the final analysis, the advantages of a novel organizational scheme outweigh the lack of crisp 
thematic overlap among the papers in the later sections. The volume is premised on breaking out 
of traditional categories. If the groupings offered in their place fail to crystalize they at least 
encourage the reader to seek out other connections between the papers. The range of topics and 
methodologies evident here mean that it can be broken down in many different ways. This makes 
the volume challenging and sometimes chaotic, but is in keeping with a methodological insistence 
on the conventional nature of boundaries. 
 
Given the diversity of approaches and topics in this volume it is understandable that “scaffolding,” 
the orienting concept, is applied differently throughout. The editors view it as a theoretical 
program, albeit an inchoate one. For some contributors it is a critical theoretical concept, 
elaborated through its application. For others it is a heuristic or a metaphor. Some ambiguities 
persist about what should count as scaffolding and what should not. As a result, readers might find 
that a clear theoretical program fails to emerge, or does so only weakly. This is a consequence of 
both the breadth of the scaffolding concept and the multidisciplinary nature of its deployment in 
this volume. But it would be premature to assess this volume on the success or failure of a 
coherent theoretical structure. Instead, we should ask what scaffolding can accomplish.  
 
Whether the approach developed here counts as a full-fledged theoretical program or not, it does 
develop a vocabulary for discussing biological phenomena at all scales of complexity. That 
vocabulary rests on some novel methodological tenets. Scaffolding, entrenchment, repeated 
assembly, reproducers, and core configurations encourage the examination of biological, cognitive, 
and cultural processes across scales and with sensitivity to how drawing conceptual boundaries 
influences theoretical judgments. On this view, it is not so critical that scaffolding really exists 
either as a thing in the world or as a consistently applied theoretical program, but rather that it 
advances fruitful conceptual and methodological tools. The range of contributions in the volume 
testifies to the potential of the scaffolding approach to be fruitful indeed. Consider this book in its 
own language: it remains to be seen if the theoretical program the editors foresee will become 
entrenched, but even if it does not, at the very least it is a scaffold. This book frames provocative 
question and identifies new investigative directions for theoretical biology. Even if the program 
described here turns out to be a temporary platform, it is at least a place where future researchers 
might stand while building something permanent.   
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